87 Quotes by Husain Haqqani

Beginning with Liaquat, moving forward with Ayub Khan and culminating with Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan’s leaders proceeded to delineate a ‘noble and eternal’ ideology that would give Pakistan ‘a tremendous power of cohesion and resistance’, insisting that it was on the basis of Islam ‘that we fought for and got Pakistan’. Islam, hostility to India, and the Urdu language were identified as the cornerstones of this new national ideology.

In the process of moulding a nation on the basis of Islam, Pakistan has ended up earning for itself the reputation for being home to the world’s angriest Muslims.

The campaign for Pakistan had, in its final stages, become a religious movement even though its leaders initiated it as a formula for resolving post-independence constitutional problems. This created confusion about Pakistan’s raison d’être, which Pakistan’s leadership has attempted to resolve through a state ideology.

For sixteen years since 9/11, Pakistan has aided the American forces in Afghanistan by providing logistical support while providing a haven to their enemies at the same time. As a result of this dichotomy, some factions of Taliban have turned on Pakistan and attacked Pakistani civilian as well as military targets. Pakistan has lost America’s trust as American critics accuse Pakistan of acting as arsonist and firefighter in Afghanistan at the same time.

Pakistan has been unfortunate that its leaders andrulers have repeatedly chosen ideological wooden-headedness over pursuit of reasonable and viable options.

The obstinate refusal to consider reform proposals and the insistence on rewriting history rather than learning from it have trapped Pakistan in a vicious circle. Instead of acknowledging bad decisions and moving away from them, Pakistan’s policymakers deny their bad choices; they then make further wrong decisions to support their denial, with further consequences and further denials. It is, based on the criteria defined by Tuchman, classic folly.

It was ironic that even in promising to end aid dependence, Pakistan’s leaders sought trade on easier terms instead of retooling their economy to expand trade as many other countries have been able to do.

The United States initially poured money and arms into Pakistan in the hope of building a major fighting force that could assist in defending Asia against communism. Pakistan repeatedly failed to live up to its promises to provide troops for any of the wars the United States fought against communist forces, instead using American weapons in its wars with India.

The traditional ulema and Islamists used the environment of jihad to advance their own agenda, and one agenda item was that they should be accepted as custodians of Pakistan’s ideology and identity. After the war, several state-sponsored publications were devoted to building the case that one Muslim soldier had the fighting prowess to subdue five Hindus.